Programmatic Risk Analysis and the Joint Confidence Level by Prince, Andy
Programmatic 
Risk Analysis and 
the Joint 
Confidence Level
Andy Prince, Manager
Engineering Cost Office
March 14, 2018
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180003513 2019-08-31T15:52:05+00:00Z
Outline
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The Challenge of Programmatic Risk Analysis
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From “Covered with Oil” by Christian Smart, this graph shows the 
sad history of a NASA project’s cost risk analysis.
The Human Condition
• Programmatic Risk Analysis is an Abstract Concept
• Confusion between Risk and Uncertainty
– Risk: Chance of Loss, Chance Something could go Wrong
– Uncertainty: Indefiniteness about the Outcome
• Probability: Yes – No – Maybe
• The World Makes Sense Looking Backwards
• We are Overconfident and Optimistic
• Our Preconceived Ideas Define the Data We Look For and the Data We See
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Our very human biases make it impossible for us to 
be purely dispassionate and logical.
We harbor a crippling 
dislike for the abstract.
Nassim Taleb, “The Black Swan”
Bringing Order to Chaos
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DOE has begun to use JCL analyses for highly complex 
projects and those with firm completion dates
• NASA has implemented a technique called Joint Cost Schedule 
Confidence Level Analysis (JCL)
• JCL incorporates cost uncertainties, schedule uncertainties, and risks 
in an analytical framework
• JCL enables project managers and senior Agency leaders to 
understand how the level of uncertainty and risk drive probable 
outcomes
What is a JCL?
• Each dot in the scatter plot 
represents a result from the 
simulation calculation (Cost, 
Schedule).
• Scatter plot shows iterations 
of cost and schedule risk 
analysis.
– Cross-hairs can be moved to a 
date and cost to obtain their joint 
confidence.
• Analysis results valid only for 
plan the inputs are based on, 
and represents a snapshot in 
time.
JCL = Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level 
Identifies the probability that a given project’s or program’s cost will be equal or less than the targeted cost AND the 
schedule will be equal or less than the targeted schedule date.
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1. Build a JCL schedule/logic network
2. Cost load the schedule
3. Implement risk list
4. Conduct uncertainty analysis
5. View results & plot
Important to Remember:  Analyze results and refine 
steps 1-5 as necessary 
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Process
Main Steps in Building a JCL
Step One:  Schedule Network
Key Concepts
• Logically linked network
• Minimize use of constraints
• Link to major milestones
• Schedule health check for viability for analysis
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Step Two:  Cost Loading
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Step Four:  Implementation of Uncertainty Analysis
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Step Five:  Visualization of Results
• Finally, after running a simulation, 
we come back to the end result as 
seen in scatterplot
• Though the scatterplot is most 
common, there are several 
additional results that are included 
with JCL analysis:
– Sensitivity Analysis Chart
– Risk Driver Chart
– Individual Cost and Schedule S-
Curves
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JCL Benefits
• Produces a Resource Loaded Schedule
– Forces Projects to Plan!
• Focuses on the Inputs to Project Plans Instead of the Outputs
– NASA management resonates with the discussion of specific technical and programmatic inputs
– Facilitates better communication between the project and the independent review team
• Reserve Levels are not Dictated by Standards or Rules of Thumb
– Derived from the project’s unique technical and programmatic characteristics 
– Facilitates better understanding and communication of project health to external stakeholders.
• Enforces Scheduling Best Practices (i.e., Schedule Health Checks)
• Strengthens Risk Management
– Quantifies risks in terms of cost and schedule impacts
– Addresses risk realization instead of only risk mitigation
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JCL Challenges
• Quality Inputs: The output of the JCL model is no more reliable than the quality of its inputs
– The higher the quality of the project’s schedule, cost, and risk management products, the 
more reliable the JCL analysis
– An adequate process can be rendered ineffective where:
• Baseline cost and schedule are incomplete or flawed
• Risk list is incomplete or under-scoped
• Uncertainty analysis is optimistic
• Proper personnel:  Identifying roles and responsibilities early is very important to a successful JCL. 
There are several key functions to be performed within the project, they are defined below:
– JCL Leader
– Scheduler
– Estimator or Resource Analyst
– Risk Manager
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A JCL requires a significant 
investment in resources, may 
not be right for all projects. 
JCL Success
Mission SRR ABC Actuals SRR to ABC SRR to Actuals ABC to Actuals
NuSTAR $96.2 $109.9 $104.0 14.2% 8.1% -5.4%
Landsat 8 $382.1 $587.6 $395.7 53.8% 3.6% -32.7%
IRIS $86.2 $140.7 $156.0 63.3% 81.1% 10.9%
LADEE $117.9 $168.2 $188.3 42.6% 59.6% 11.9%
MAVEN $488.7 $567.2 $467.9 16.1% -4.2% -17.5%
GPM $660.2 $555.2 $470.5 -15.9% -28.7% -15.3%
OCO-2 $225.2 $249.0 $304.6 10.6% 35.3% 22.3%
SMAP $412.0 $485.7 $469.9 17.9% 14.0% -3.2%
MMS $741.0 $857.3 $962.3 15.7% 29.9% 12.2%
Astro-H $30.0 $44.9 $51.0 49.9% 70.1% 13.5%
OSIRIS-Rex $515.7 $778.6 $648.7 51.0% 25.8% -16.7%
CYGNSS $125.0 $152.8 $90.1 22.2% -27.9% -41.0%
SAGE-III $56.8 $64.6 $81.6 13.7% 43.7% 26.3%
Average 27.3% 23.9% -2.7%
Cost GrowthData
Average Cost Underrun to Agency Baseline Commitment
Indicates that JCL and Independent Assessment Process
May be Working
Validating the Programmatic Risk Analysis
• Process
– GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide
• Coefficient of Variation (CV)
– Air Force: “…early in the project 35-45% is typical for space systems and software 
intensive projects; 25-35% is typical for aircraft and similar complexity hardware; and 
10-20% is typical of large electronic system procurements”
– Joint Cost Schedule Risk Uncertainty Handbook: table of CV’s based on NCCA cost 
growth experience
• Historical Experience
– Using historical data to determine an expected level of cost growth, approach favored 
by MDA
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Cost Risk Process*
1. Determine the program cost drivers and associated risks.
2. Develop probability distributions to model various types of uncertainty.
3. Account for correlation between cost elements.
4. Perform the uncertainty analysis using a Monte Carlo simulation model.
5. Identify the probability level associated with the point estimate.
6. Recommend sufficient contingency reserves to achieve an acceptable level 
of confidence.
7. Allocate, phase, and convert a risk-adjusted cost estimate to then-year 
dollars and identify high-risk elements to help in risk mitigation efforts.
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*Seven steps associated with developing a justifiable s-curve from the GAO 
Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, GAO-09-3SP (page 159)
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The Coefficient of Variation
• Coefficient of Variation (CV) is a standardized measure of dispersion for a probability distribution 
(and thus the amount of uncertainty)
• CV = Standard Deviation/Mean
• CV is an output of most Monte Carlo simulation programs (@Risk, Argo, etc.)
• CV measures the “flatness” of the S-Curve
– The greater the CV the greater the relative cost difference between percentile values
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NASA Cost Growth History
Note that the probability of no cost 
growth (15.2%) is about the same as 
the probability of > 100% cost growth 
(12.0%)!
Historical Cost Growth PDF
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Modeling the Cost Growth PDF
Lognormal Distribution Fitted to 
Cost Growth Data
Develop an eSBM Model with:
Mean = 74.4%
Std Dev = 56.6%
Offset = -30.7%
CV = 0.761
Validation Summary
• Process
– Are you accounting for correlation?
– Are all sources of uncertainty adequately addressed?
– Beware of optimism and overconfidence.
– Beware the triangle distribution!
• History and the Coefficient of Variation (CV)
– Your CV should be unique to the assumptions in your analysis but within the context of your 
organization’s historical experience.
– Compare the CV of your s-curve to a CV derived from historical cost and schedule growth data.
– Fit a probability distribution function to your historical data to have a simple model for validation.
– Use other techniques, such as the enhanced Scenario Based Method (eSBM) to develop 
alternative models for comparison (and vice versa).
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Your Cost/Schedule Risk Analysis should be a 
Logical Outcome of all the Evidence
In Summary
• Doing good programmatic risk analysis is hard
• The CV is an useful measure but it must be consistent with your 
organization’s cost and schedule growth history
• DOE has cost risk and JCL experts – take advantage of them!
• Are you ignoring key sources of uncertainty?
– CER uncertainty
– Highly suspect assumptions (i.e. TRL 9, off-the-shelf, etc.)
– Sensitivity analysis
– Historical data
• Extreme growth is a reality, be a realist
• Remember: The less you know the greater the uncertainty in your estimate!
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